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Abstract 
Prior research assumes that high-status actors have greater organizational influence than lower-
status ones, that is, it is easier for the former to get their ideas and initiatives adopted by the 
organization than it is for the latter. Drawing from the literature on ideology, we posit that the 
status-influence link is contingent on actors’ ideological position. Specifically, status confers 
organizational influence to the degree that the focal actor is ideologically mainstream. The 
more an actor’s ideology deviates from the mainstream the less will her status translate into 
increased organizational influence. We find support for this hypothesis using data on the work 
of legislators in the House of Representatives in the U.S. Congress. By illuminating how and 
under what conditions status leads to increased influence, this study qualifies and extends 
current understandings of the role of status in organizations.  
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Introduction 
A widely established tenet among organizational scholars is that high-status actors are 
more influential than lower-status ones. A stream of experimental and observational research 
finds that, in task-oriented groups, the ideas of high-status members carry greater weight in 
determining the solutions a group adopts and the directions it takes (Berger, Rosenholtz, & 
Zelditch, 1980; De Kwaadsteniet & Van Dijk, 2010; Eckel & Wilson, 2007). Similarly, at a 
more macroscopic level, research shows that high-status actors have more influence in shaping 
the ideas and practices that gain support and become adopted, both within and across 
organizations (Coleman, Katz, & Menzel, 1966; Nerkar & Paruchuri, 2005; Podolny & Stuart, 
1995; Rogers, [1983] 2010; Simmel, [1904] 1957; Van den Bulte & Joshi, 2007). The status-
influence link is taken to be so straightforward that it is often considered to be a defining feature 
of status (Anderson et al., 2001; Berger et al., 1977; Ridgeway & Walker, 1995; Ridgeway & 
Correll, 2006).  
Some researchers, however, criticize this approach and suggest that status should be 
distinguished from its consequences (Bunderson et al., 2016; Fiske & Berdahl, 2007; Magee 
& Frasier, 2014; Magee & Galinsky, 2008; see Blader & Chen, 2014 for a review). These 
authors point out several examples illustrating how status might not always be associated with 
organizational influence, defined as the ability to get one’s ideas and initiatives adopted by the 
organization. Magee and Fraiser (2014), for instance, highlight that although ambassadors to 
foreign countries and members of advisory boards often hold high status, such status confers 
limited actual influence. Fiske and Berdahl (2007, p. 682) argue that lame-duck administrators 
often enjoy high status but have little influence over organizational outcomes.1 Furthermore, 
several small group studies suggest that the link between status and influence might be more 
tenuous than is generally assumed. For example, evidence suggests that status confers limited 
influence when there are different viewpoints about a task (Hong et al., 2019). The overall 
implication from these studies is that to improve our understanding of the role of status in 
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organizations, it is important to decouple status from its consequences and examine the 
conditions under which status confers organizational influence. 
In this study, we propose ideology as a key moderating factor determining whether 
status translates into influence. Ideology is defined as a set of  relatively coherent and stable 
beliefs associated with ostensible preferences about a social domain (Allport, Clark, & 
Pettigrew, 1954; Converse, [1964] 2006; Gerring, 1997, p. 980; Knight, 2006). The construct 
of ideology is often associated with politics, which is the setting in which we test our theory. 
However, a number of studies show that ideology is also relevant to organizations more 
generally (Barley & Kunda, 1992; Bunderson, 2001; Fiss & Zajac, 2004; Guillén, 1994; Kunda 
& Ailon, 2006; Mees-Buss & Welch, 2019; Meyer, 1986; Simons & Ingram, 1997; Weiss & 
Miller, 1987). This is especially the case for matters related to wider social issues, such as 
sustainability or welfare (Guillén, 1994; Hafenbrädl & Waeger, 2017; Mees-Buss & Welch, 
2019), since managers tend to adhere to ideologies which they believe will bring benefits to 
their organizations and society at large. In his study of managerial ideologies, for example, 
Guillén cites the CEO of IBM, a public proponent of the managerial ideology of Human 
Relations, claiming that “without our attitude towards human relations we would have fallen 
short of our business goals” (Guillén, 1994, pp. 77-78).  
Prior studies concur that ideologies within organizations are not monolithic and that 
organizations’ members often adhere to different, sometimes opposing, ideologies. For 
example, Mees-Buss and Welch (2019) analyze the dynamics of an ideological conflict at 
Unilever, where managers were divided between normative and rational ideologies in the 
redefinition of Dove as a socially responsible brand. While largely ignored in previous research 
on the status-influence link, such differences in ideology shape how actors evaluate each 
other’s ideas and actions and how they relate to one another (Denzau & North, 1994; Weiss & 
Miller, 1987). Accordingly, we propose that considering actors’ position in an ideological 
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space might enable us to evaluate the conditions under which status confers organizational 
influence. Our main contention of is that status confers organizational influence to the degree 
that the focal actor is recognized to be ideologically mainstream. By contrast, the more an 
actor’s ideology deviates from the mainstream the less her status will translate into increased 
influence.  
We test our argument using data on the work of legislators in the House of 
Representatives in the U.S. Congress, an organization in which the subject matter of ideology 
is government. While our proposition is relevant for organizations in general, focusing on the 
United States House of Representatives offers an ideal vantage point to test this proposition. 
Decision-making processes in this organization, as in many other contemporary organizations, 
comprise multiple decision-making points that involve deliberations, and where securing 
others’ attention, approval, and endorsement are important to have influence (Chown & Liu, 
2015). An advantage of our setting is that it provides a high level of detail about which 
initiatives progress through these decision-making points, and enables us to measure the status 
and ideological positioning of each legislator. We examine 873 legislators’ status, ideology, 
and influence in the legislative process over eight consecutive congresses. We find that the 
effect of status is entirely contingent on ideology: it enhances an actor’s influence if her 
ideological position fits squarely within current mainstream ideology, but not if it deviates from 
it.  
Theory 
Prior research shows that status confers several advantages (Piazza & Castellucci, 
2014). In particular, a widely held argument is that status confers organizational influence, that 
is, the ability to get particular ideas or initiatives adopted by the organization (Coleman et al., 
1966; Nerkar & Paruchuri, 2005; Rogers, [1983] 2010). The literature advances three main 
mechanisms to support this claim. First, status elicits greater attention, a pre-requisite to have 
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influence (Simcoe & Waguespack, 2011). Second, status is associated with higher quality 
evaluations (Azoulay, Stuart, & Wang, 2013; Clark, Clark, & Polborn, 2006; Merton, [1948] 
1968; Ridgeway, 1981; Simcoe & Waguespack, 2011). Third, status helps actors build stronger 
coalitions around their ideas and initiatives (Simpson et al., 2012, p. 150; Watkins & Rosegrant, 
1996, p. 60). For these reasons, the likelihood that an idea or initiative will be adopted by the 
organization is higher if its proponent has high status (Coleman et al., 1966; Nerkar & 
Paruchuri, 2005; Rogers, [1983] 2010).  
We expect these advantages to also be relevant for the work of legislators within the 
United States House of Representatives – the empirical focus of the present study. To explain 
why, we begin by providing a description of the legislative process and then articulate how 
status may provide organizational influence in that context.  
Legislative process in the House of Representatives 
The legislative process in the House of Representatives is highly formalized. Each bill 
is introduced by a single legislator, who acts as the bill’s sponsor. Other legislators can endorse 
the legislative initiative of the sponsor by cosponsoring it, i.e., by affixing their signature to the 
bill. Once a bill is introduced, the speaker of the House directs it to a committee, which in turn 
works with subcommittees. Committees are not compelled to consider a bill and may reject 
them (Smith, Roberts, & Vander Wielen, 2013). If the committee approves the bill, it is then 
scheduled for discussion and put to a vote (Smith et al., 2013).2  
In order to increase the likelihood of success of their legislative initiatives, sponsors 
seek cosponsors, because cosponsorships signal the potential benefits of a bill to key agenda 
setters (e.g., committee members, speaker of the House, majority party leader). Agenda setters 
pay attention to cosponsors (Kessler & Krehbiel, 1996; Koger, 2003, p. 227; Krutz, 2005; 
Schiller, 1995) when evaluating whether a bill should be moved forward. Consequently, 
legislators who sponsor bills search for cosponsors to signal to agenda setters that their bill is 
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likely to be a success: “a lot of times congressmen cosponsor because they have been asked by 
a member who wants to get support to get committee action” (Koger, 2003, p. 231). Such acts 
of support are not necessarily reciprocated and reflect a status hierarchy among legislators 
(Gould, 2002; Jourdan et al., 2017; Rushing, 1962, p. 146). For example, Harward and Moffett 
(2010, p.127) explain that legislators who have the most prestige and influence “might be 
unwilling to compromise that influence by overextending the utility of their endorsement” and 
are therefore more selective in granting their support.  
Status advantage in the legislative process. Building on the three mechanisms 
elaborated above (i.e., greater attention, superior quality evaluations, and more effective 
coalition building), we expect that a legislator’s high status within the House of Representatives 
will help her secure favorable outcomes for her bills throughout the legislative process. First, 
a large number of bills are under consideration at a given point in time. Most legislators, 
including committee members to whom the bill has been directed, are likely to allocate their 
attention (e.g., study the bill, gather background information, consult constituencies) to no 
more than a tiny minority of these bills. Extant theory suggests that bills sponsored by high-
status legislators are more likely to attract the attention of colleagues (see Simcoe & 
Waguespack, 2011 for evidence in another setting). Conversely, bills that carry the name of 
low-status legislators are more likely to pass unnoticed. Second, the evaluation of a bill is likely 
to be positively affected by the status of its sponsor (Azoulay et al., 2013; Merton, [1948]1968; 
Simcoe & Waguespack, 2011). As a consequence, holding everything else constant, legislators 
are more likely to cosponsor, support in committees, and then vote in favor of bills sponsored 
by high-status legislators than by low-status ones. Third, lower-status legislators have an 
incentive to support the bills of high-status peers, in the expectation that they will be repaid for 
their help at some point in the future (Blau, [1964] 1986; Goode, 1978; Homans, 1961). Hence, 
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high-status legislators are in a privileged position to negotiate support (e.g., Castellucci & 
Ertug, 2010)  and forge coalitions around their bills. 
These arguments suggest that status should enhance influence over the advancement of 
new legislation in the House of Representatives. Accordingly, we offer the following baseline 
expectation:  
 
Baseline expectation: Status enhances legislators’ influence as indicated 
by their ability to advance legislative proposals. 
 
The ideological boundaries of status advantage 
 Bothner, Kim, and Smith (2010) point out that the advantages accruing to high-status 
actors are vulnerable because they are not owned by the status holder. Rather, they accrue to 
the status holder because, and insofar as, others bestow them to the status holder. This 
observation is important for our key hypothesis, suggesting that status translates into increased 
organizational influence to the degree that the ideology espoused by the status holder is in line 
with the current mainstream ideology of the organization.   
As we summarized in our overview, status enhances an actor’s organizational influence 
via three mechanisms: it increases attention, it elicits higher evaluations, and it helps build 
coalitions around one’s initiatives. We propose that these mechanisms operate in full force 
when the status holder’s ideology falls squarely within the mainstream ideology of her 
organization, but they become weaker as the status holder’s ideology deviates from the 
mainstream. First, we argued that legislators are more likely to pay attention to bills sponsored 
by high-status actors. However, the strength of this effect is likely to be weaker for actors who 
are not ideologically mainstream, because people tend to have negative preconceptions about 
those who are ideologically distant from them. Hence, even though high-status legislators 
holding non-mainstream ideologies are likely to elicit a great deal of attention among the 
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restricted circle of legislators who are ideologically close to them, this will not be the case 
among the majority of legislators.  
Second, the literature suggests that status enhances organizational influence by eliciting 
higher evaluations of quality. Here, too, we suggest that the strength of this mechanism will 
decline as the status holder’s ideology deviates from mainstream. The reason is that evaluations 
of quality are rarely purely objective; rather, they are embedded in a set of underlying beliefs 
and values (Sauder et al., 2012, pp. 275-276). By informing the values and beliefs an actors 
holds, an actor’s ideology may shape the evaluative process in two ways. First, it may influence 
the objectives an actor aims to achieve when preparing, elaborating, and communicating her 
initiatives. Second, it may affect the value criteria she uses in evaluating the initiatives of 
others. The result is that status provides an unambiguous signal of quality among actors who 
espouse a mainstream ideology. However, the further away an actor’s ideology is from 
mainstream, the more likely her definition of quality will differ from that of other legislators 
and, therefore, the weaker will be the signaling mechanism associated with high status. 
Third, whereas the literature posits that status confers influence by enhancing an actor’s 
ability to forge coalitions around their initiatives, ideologically non-mainstream legislators may 
not be able to enjoy such benefits to the same degree. Legislators who are ideologically far 
from the mainstream hold beliefs and values that diverge from those of most other legislators, 
sometimes on principle matters, which makes it more difficult to identify acceptable 
compromises during negotiations (Converse, [1964] 2006, pp. 5-6). Furthermore, ideologically 
non-mainstream legislators are likely to confront greater difficulties in forging coalitions 
around their bills because legislators are keenly aware of the symbolic and practical costs they 
might incur by associating with legislators espousing non-mainstream ideologies. Thus, when 
determining whether support a proposal, legislators may think twice before providing support 
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to a bill submitted by a sponsor who is non-mainstream. The above arguments lead to our 
central hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis: The positive relationship between a legislator’s status and 
influence (as indicated by her ability to advance legislative proposals) 
holds for mainstream legislators but erodes as the ideology of the 
legislator departs from the mainstream.  
 
Data and methods 
Our analysis is based on a data set of legislative work in the U.S. House of 
Representatives (hereafter the House). There are 435 representatives in the House, who are 
elected every two years. Each two-year period is called a Congress (e.g., 1997-1999 for the 
105th Congress and 1999-2001 for the 106th Congress and so on). Our data ranges from the 
105th Congress to the 112th Congress. 873 representatives worked in the House during this 
period. The data we use in our analyses result from a combination of the Volden and Wiseman 
(2014) data on representatives and their legislative effectiveness in congress between 1973 and 
2014 and information on individual bills from the @theunitedstates project, which is a dataset 
compiled by the Sunlight Foundation, Govtrack, New York Times and the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation.   
Dependent variables  
 Legislative effectiveness. To measure legislators’ ability to advance legislative 
proposals, we adopt an index that has been developed in political science, which is the 
Legislative Effectiveness Score (LES)  (Volden & Wiseman, 2014; Volden & Wiseman, 2016; 
Volden, Wiseman, & Wittmer, 2013). The LES is a composite index that measures legislators’ 
influence – their ability to get their legislative initiatives adopted by the House – in a granular 
fashion across the whole legislative process. Specifically, for each legislator, the composite 
index includes how many bills (i) she introduces, (ii) receive action in committee (AIC), (iii) 
pass committee and receive action on the floor of the House (ABC), (iv) pass the House 
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(PASS), and ultimately (v) become law (LAW) and gives greater weight to the advanced stages 
of the legislative process. The LES is robust to different weighting schemes (Volden & 
Wiseman, 2014, pp. 56-68) and provides a more accurate measure of legislators’ ability to 
advance legislative proposals than alternative measures, such as those that take into account 
enacted laws only (Volden & Wiseman, 2014, pp. 54-56). As consistent with the work of 
Volden and Wiseman the scores are calculated for each congress. 
Independent variable  
Status. As explained above, cosponsorship is a public (it is visible to others) and 
asymmetric (actor A cosponsoring B does not necessarily imply that actor B will in turn 
cosponsor actor A’s initiative) act of support that serves to build and maintain relationships 
between legislators. As such, cosponsorsing is an act of deference that can signal the status 
hierarchy between legislators (Gould, 2002; Harward & Moffett, 2010; Jourdan et al., 2017). 
In such a network defined by acts of cosponsorship, status can be operationalized recursively, 
such that actors have high status to the extent that they receive deference from other actors, 
who also receive deference from other high status actors (Bonacich, 1972, 1987; Podolny, 
2005). For each congress, we construct a non symmetric square matrix X in which each cell 
𝒙𝒊𝒋 records the number of times legislator i has had her bills cosponsored by j during this 
congress. The possible asymmetry (legislators supporting one another’s bills to different 
degrees) is an important part of capturing differences (asymmetry) in patterns of deference. We 
then use this matrix to compute a measure of the status of each legislator using Bonacich’s 
network centrality measure (Bonacich, 1987). The Bonacich’s network centrality measure of 
centrality can be defined as follows: 
𝑺𝒊𝒕(𝜶, 𝜷) = ∑(𝜶 + 𝜷𝑺𝒋𝒕)𝒙𝒊𝒋𝒕
𝒋
 
𝑺𝒊𝒕 is the status of actor i for congress t, j is the index of i’s contacts,  is a scaling 
constant, and  is a parameter that determines the extent to which the status of an individual is 
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affected by the status of her peers. The value of  ranges between 0 and the inverse of the norm 
of the maximum eigenvalue of X. We set  to 75 percent of the reciprocal of the largest 
eigenvalue.3   
The status of a legislator may change from congress to congress. Accordingly, we 
recalculate it for each congress using all the data on cosponsorship for that congress. It is an 
advantage of this setting that there are longitudinal data to enable the recalculation of a 
legislator’s status for each congress. An attribute of status that has been noted is that it is 
relatively stable and slow to change. Some studies have have assumed status to be absolutely 
“stable” (time-invariant) by using indicators that are either measured only at one point in time 
or that, by definition, cannot change. If we compare our measure to those used in studies that 
have measured status over time, our measure displays similar levels of stability. The 
autocorrelation of status (i.e., the correlation between the status of a legislator in a given 
congress and her status in the previous congress) in our setting is 0.67, which compares well 
with those reported in prior studies (e.g., 0.52 in Podolny and Phillips (1996); 0.41 in 
Washington and Zajac (2005), and 0.52 in Castellucci and Ertug (2010)).  
The status score we calculate for each congress is lagged, so that when we predict 
Legislative effectiveness of a legislator in a given congress, we use her Status score from the 
previous congress. 
It is important to note that that an actor’s ideological position and status do not 
necessarily covary. Prior research shows that rising high-status actors can be outside the 
mainstream (Bourdieu & Desault, 1975; Cattani, Ferriani, & Allison, 2014). In our setting, 
there are a number of high-status legislators who are positioned far from the ideological 
mainstream. Well-known examples during the time period covered by our study are Ron Paul 
(Republican) and George Miller (Democrat), who, despite holding far from mainstream 
positions in the ideological space, were high in status.4 Beyond such examples, in terms of the 
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overall relationship, the correlation in our estimation sample between status and ideological 
distance from the median ideology is rather low (r = 0.06). 
Moderating variable 
Ideological distance from the median. Following the political science literature, we 
measure legislators’ ideology using a spatial model of parliamentary voting. This model 
assumes that legislators have preference functions centered around ideal points that identify 
their preferred outcomes regarding the issues being voted on, and that these ideal points can be 
derived from legislators’ positioning on basic ideological dimensions (Poole, 2005; Poole & 
Rosenthal, [2007] 2009). Poole and Rosenthal have shown that a two dimensional ideological 
space is adequate to explain the voting behavior of legislators during the entire existence of the 
U.S. congress with a sufficient level of accuracy. Furthermore, and more pertinent to the time 
period we study (i.e., contemporary U.S. politics), Poole and Rosenthal note that voting 
behavior can be explained using a single dimension, this dimension being the liberal-
conservative axis (Poole & Rosenthal, [2007] 2009). The “liberal” and “conservatives” labels 
maps onto a series of positions on different subjects, such as for example taxation and 
regulation, which are tied to each other.5 If there are p legislators, one liberal-conservative 
dimension in the ideological space and n issues on which legislators take position, the spatial 
model can be explained by the relationship (Poole, 2005, 2007):  
xw = Y   (1) 
x is a column vector with p components corresponding to each legislator. Each 
component of x indicates the positioning of the legislator on the liberal-conservative 
continuum. w is a row vector with n components that maps the position of the legislator on the 
liberal-conservative continuum onto their ideal points for each position. In other words, w maps 
legislators on the liberal-conservative continuum (i.e., vector x) onto a matrix Y in which each 
cell indicates the extent to which a specific legislator is likely to support a specific bill. For 
example, a cell in Y might indicate whether a legislator is likely to support the inspection 
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mandate of the Occupational Health Safety Administration as a function of her positioning on 
the liberal-conservative continuum (Poole & Rosenthal, 2007). Legislators who are at the 
conservative end of the liberal-conservative continuum are predicted to favor no inspection 
mandate. Legislator who are the center of the spectrum will favor inspection for firms above a 
certain size and liberal legislators will support inspection for almost all firms. 
We use the first dimension of the DW-NOMINATE (dynamic weighted nominal three 
step estimation) scores of each politician in each congress (i.e., their position on the liberal-
conservative continuum in each congress). A legislator’s first dimension in the DW-
NOMINATE score in a given congress is derived from their entire roll-call voting history, 
which makes it feasible to compare ideological scores across congresses. The score ranges 
within the [-1, 1] interval. A score close to 1 indicates that the legislator is very conservative 
and a score close to -1 that the legislator is very liberal. This score can be mapped on the set of 
ideology positions corresponding to the liberal and conservative dimensions. For example, 
Henry Waxman is a Democrat who represented the 29th district in California in the 107th 
Congress. Waxman’s DW-NOMINATE score on the first dimension in this congress was -
0.521, which locates him in the 11th percentile of the most liberal members of congress. 
Waxman is known for his positions on universal health insurance, Medicaid, favoring air and 
quality standards (source: politico.com). By contrast, Waxman voted against a bill that 
proposed to eliminate the estate tax (see Govtrack, HR-8 Death Tax Elimination of 2001 vote 
#84) and against House Resolution 1836 (107th): Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2001 also known as the “Bush Tax cuts” in 2001. On the conservative 
side, Jack Kingston is a Republican representative of the first district of Georgia in the 107th 
Congress. He had a DW-NOMINATE score of 0.586, which puts him in the 86th most 
conservative percentile in the House. In contrast with Waxman, Kingston voted for the 
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elimination of the Estate tax and for the Bush tax cuts. Further, in the 111th congress Kingston 
opposed the affordable care act (i.e., “Obamacare”). 
The ideological position of legislators is stable over time (Poole, 2005, pp. 137-139). 
Whereas particular policy preferences of legislators may change, legislators’ ideological 
position relative to their peers rarely changes. For example, even though the September 11th 
attacks modified the policy preferences of legislators in general with regards to privacy and 
national security, the (relative) positioning of these legislators onto the basic liberal-
conservative dimension remained virtually unchanged (Poole, 2007, p. 448). The observed 
changes in the average ideological positioning of the chamber occur in large part due to the 
turnover of legislators: because of election outcomes, retirement, and other types of exits. 
Likewise, when the majority party changes, the ideological positioning of the House naturally 
moves towards the ideology of the majority party. However, the positions of legislators 
(relative to others who are in the House in that congress) on the ideological scale remains stable 
(Poole, 2007). Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that legislators’ ideology does not vary 
endogenously with their status or influence. This assumption is borne out by analyses in 
previous studies.6 In our own estimation sample, the correlation between a politician’s score in 
a given congress and in the previous one is 0.99. 
We measure the degree to which the ideology of a legislator is far from the mainstream 
by calculating the ideological distance of this legislator from the median ideological score in 
the House of Representatives. We use Ideological distance from the median in the entire House 
to test our hypothesis. As we detail later, we also ran the same estimations using Ideological 
distance from the median ideology of majority party as a robustness check. The two measures 
are correlated 0.91 and the results remain substantively unchanged. 
Control variables 
Building on the work of Volden and Wiseman, we include a set of control variables 
that have been found to influence a legislator’s ability to advance legislation (Volden & 
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Wiseman, 2014; Volden et al., 2013). Seniority is the number of terms a legislator has served 
in the House. A dummy variable indicates whether the legislator is in the Majority party. Other 
dummy variables are included as indicators of whether a legislator occupies a formal position 
from which she could influence the progress of a bill or positions whose holder traditionally 
does not introduce legislation: (a) majority party leader (Majority leader), (b) minority party 
leader (Minority leader), (c) speaker of the House (Speaker), (d) Committee chair, and (e) 
Power committee member (member of Appropriations, Rules or Ways or Means Committees) 
(Deering & Smith, 1997; Volden & Wiseman, 2014). The size of the congressional delegation 
from the state of the legislator is included to take into account potential coalitions among 
representatives from the same state (Size of congressional delegation). A vote share (Vote 
share) variable is included to take into account that members in safe seats may not be under 
pressure to promote legislations and that members who are in risky positions may be focusing 
on activities other than legislation such as raising campaign funds (Volden & Wiseman, 2014).    
 We also control for the size and density of the cosponsorship network of each legislator. 
We consider two legislators to be connected, i.e., a tie to exist between, if either of these 
legislators cosponsored at least one bill of the other legislator within a given congress (Fowler, 
2006). Using this definition for each focal legislator (ego), we identify others who have ties 
with her (alter), which end up constituting this focal legislator’s network. We control for the 
Network size (logged) of each legislator, which is the total number of distinct legislators who 
either cosponsor bills sponsored by ego, or whose sponsored bills are cosponsored by ego. We 
use this same definition of a tie in assessing whether a given pair of ego’s direct contacts, i.e., 
those legislators who are in ego’s network, are also connected to each other. We control for 
Network density, which captures the degree to which the contacts of a focal individual are 
connected to each other. Specifically, a focal legislator’s network density is the proportion of 
the ties that exist between each pair of direct contacts of this legislator to the total possible 
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number of ties between those pairs. As with legislative effectiveness and status, these network 
measures are recalculated based on the sponsoring and cosponsoring activity in each congress. 
Likewise, these two measures are also lagged. Network size and Network density show 
moderate to strong correlations with Status, as might be expected. Removing either one or both 
of these variables from our models leaves the statistical support for our hypothesis unchanged 
(when checked in Models 4 and 5 in Table 2, the main effect of status has a positive coefficient 
and our hypothesized interaction has a negative coefficient, p < 0.05 for both, after removing 
either or both of the network measures). 
Research in political science suggests that bill valence (i.e., quality of the bill, in terms 
of chances of making it through the process) facilitates legislative effectiveness (Hirsch & 
Shotts, 2012; Hitt, Volden, & Wiseman, 2017). Therefore, legislators might aim to increase the 
valence (i.e., quality) of their bills, making them more attractive to other legislators and more 
likely to pass the House, independent of their ideology. Therefore, we construct a proxy, Bill 
valence, to account for the quality of the bills. Each bill has a list of keywords (e.g., higher 
education, manufacturing, oil and gas), which can be collected from GovTrack. These 
keywords provide one way to characterize the content of the bill. The success of a legislator in 
getting bills passed might be because others defer to the sponsor and endorse her initiatives, or 
it might be that the content of the bill is such that it is more likely to be pass the House. We 
control for the success probability of a given bill by adopting an approach similar to that of 
Kovács and Sharkey (2014, p. 14), who calculate a book reader’s predicted rating for a book 
based on the focal book’s genres and the reviewer’s previous evaluations of other books in 
those genres. This approach is known as collaborative filtering, which is used in computer 
science and marketing (e.g., Fleder & Hosanagar, 2009). We calculate this variable starting 
from congress 106, using the first congress in our sample (105) as our “burning” period. We 
proxy the probability of success for bills in a given congress on the basis of the success of their 
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keywords in the previous congress(es). To provide an example,7 assume that congress 105 has 
3 bills, all with 3 keywords: bill 1 (keywords: drug, FDA, addiction), bill 2 (keywords: weapon, 
army, Iraq), and bill 3 (keywords: weapon, army, Iran). Bill 1 passed the House (success = 1), 
bill 2 did not pass the House (success = 0), and bill 3 passed the House (success = 1). Now, if 
bill 1 in congress 106 has four keywords: drug, army, weapon, war, we first calculate the 
success probability of each keyword as follows: Success probability of drug = 1; Success 
probability of army = (1+0)/2 = 0.5; Success probability of weapon = (1+0)/2 = 0.5; Success 
probability of war = (.) [missing value, not used in the calculation], because it did not appear 
before. Then we take the average success probability of all keywords (drug, army, weapon) as 
the success probability of the focal bill, which is (1+0.5+0.5)/3 = 0.667. Second, we take the 
average success probability of all bills sponsored by the focal legislator in the focal congress 
to arrive at our measure of Bill valence for this legislator.  
Finally, we also include indicator variables for each congress, Congress dummies, to 
take into account characteristics of a given congress that might intervene in the relationship 
between Status, Ideological distance from the median, and Legislative effectiveness.  
Estimation 
 We use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with legislator fixed-effects to 
estimate our models. We used legislator fixed-effects estimations based on the results of a 
Hausman test (p < 0.001). Because of this fixed-effects estimation, variables such as gender or 
ethnic origin are not included in the model, since their effects do not vary within individuals in 
our observation period. The support we report for our prediction remains statistically 
significant (p < 0.001) if we choose to not use fixed effects and perform a random effects 
estimation, in this case also adding indicators for the gender and ethnic origin of the legislator 
in our models. We use robust standard errors, clustered on each legislator, to take into account 
the possible non-independence of observations across congresses for the same legislator.  
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Results 
 Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations. The correlation between 
Ideological distance from the median and Status is very weak (r = 0.06). The correlation 
between Status and Legislative effectiveness is positive (r = 0.24), which is consistent with the 
baseline expectation. The correlation between Network size and Network density is negative (r 
= -0.69), as consistent with prior research. Status and Network size are strongly positively 
correlated (r = 0.67), which might give some readers concern. As we noted in our discussion 
of the variables, the removal of Network size does not reduce the statistical support for our 
prediction. 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 & 2, and Figure 1 here 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
The results of our regressions are presented in Table 2. Model 1 includes all the control 
variables. As expected, Bill valence is positive and significant. Majority party member, 
Majority leader, and Committee chair all have a positive and significant effect on Legislative 
effectiveness, which is consistent with the fact that legislators in a powerful party or powerful 
positions have more influence and are therefore more effective in advancing legislative 
proposals. Consistent with prior research we also find that Power committee has a negative 
effect on Legislative effectiveness. Members of “power” committees devote most of their time 
to the work of the committee rather than to their own legislative initiative, and high priority 
legislation is typically introduced by the chair in these committees (Volden, Wiseman, & 
Wittmer, 2013, p. 11).  
We add Ideological distance from the median in Model 2. The coefficient of Ideological 
distance from the median is not significant, indicating that a legislator’s Ideological distance 
from the median on its own, once other factors are taken into account, does not influence her 
Legislative effectiveness.  
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We add Status in Model 3 (and remove Ideological distance from the median in this 
model to show the effect of Status across the models). The effect of Status on Legislative 
effectiveness is positive and significant (p = 0.062), which provides support for the baseline 
expectation. We add Status and Ideological distance from the median together in Model 4. The 
results are consistent with those presented in Model 2 and Model 3. The coefficient of 
Ideological distance from the median is not significant, and the coefficient of Status is positive 
and significant (p < 0.05). In Model 5, we add the interaction between Ideological distance 
from the median and Status. The coefficient is negative and significant (p < 0.001), indicating 
that the positive relationship between Status and Legislative effectiveness is weaker (negatively 
moderated) as the legislator’s Ideological distance from the median increases. This finding 
provides support for our hypothesis.  
The coefficients in Model 5 indicate that for legislators whose Ideological distance 
from the median is one standard deviation below the mean (what one might consider as 
ideologically orthodox or mainstream legislators), one standard deviation increase in Status 
increases Legislative effectiveness by 0.21 standard deviations. However, for legislators whose 
Ideological distance from the median is one standard deviation above mean (i.e., ideologically 
non-mainstream legislators), one standard deviation increase in Status yields no increase 
whatsoever in Legislative effectiveness (it in fact decreases by -0.01 standard deviations, but 
practically this is not different from no change). Another way of indicating the strength of the 
interaction effect is that for legislators whose Ideological distance from the median is greater 
than 0.57 (which places them on the 61st percentile in terms of their Ideological distance from 
the median), even a two standard deviation increase in status does not yield a statistically 
significant increase in their legislative effectiveness. 
We illustrate the interaction effect between Status and Ideological distance from the 
median in Figure 1. The solid line plots the effect of Status on Legislative effectiveness when 
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Ideological distance from the median is one standard deviation below the mean (legislators 
close to mainstream). The dashed line plots the same relationship when Ideological distance 
from the median is one standard deviation above mean (legislators far from the mainstream).  
------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 and Figure 2 here 
------------------------------------------------- 
Robustness analysis 
First, we use an alternative dependent variable, the (log) Number of bills that passed 
the House, as in Liu and Srivastava (2018). We present the results in Table 3, with the 
interaction effects plotted in Figure 2. Our hypothesis continues to receive support (p < 0.01), 
with the positive main effect of status also continuing be statistically significant (p < 0.01). 
Second, even though research indicates that the median of the majority party is close to 
the median of the chamber, and previous studies have used the distance from the median of the 
chamber (Volden et al., 2013; Wiseman & Wright, 2008), to assess the robustness of our 
results, we also operationalize distance using Ideological distance from the median ideology of 
Majority party. The correlation between our main measure of distance and this alternative is 
0.91. The results are consistent with those reported in Table 2. The effect of Status on 
Legislative effectiveness is positive and significant (p = 0.054), and the coefficient of the 
interaction between Ideological distance from the median ideology of Majority party and Status 
is negative and significant (p < 0.001). 
Third, the β used in our operationalization of status is 0.75 times the reciprocal of the 
largest eigenvalue. As we note in footnote 4, the correlations between the status scores using 
different values of β, ranging from 0.6 to 0.995 are very high. If we re-run our estimations in 
Table 2 using an alternative operationalization in this rangethe effect of Status on Legislative 
effectiveness remains positive and significant (p < 0.05), and the coefficient of the interaction 
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between Ideological distance from the median and Status remains negative and significant (p 
< 0.001). 
Fourth, we operationalized status by using eigenvector centrality instead of Bonacich’s 
centrality. We re-ran the estimations in Table 2 using this alternative operationalization. The 
effect of Status on Legislative effectiveness remains positive and significant (p < 0.05), and the 
coefficient of the interaction between Ideological distance from the median and Status remains 
negative and significant (p < 0.05). 
Fifth, Kirkland (2011) suggests that weak ties between legislators are useful in 
increasing effectiveness. To account for this possibility, we follow Kirkland (2011) to calculate 
measures for legislators’ strong ties and weak ties. We created four measures, Number of strong 
ties, Number of weak ties, Secondary connections from strong ties, and Secondary connections 
from weak ties.8 We added these four measures to our models (i.e., those in Table 2) and our 
results continue to hold. The effect of Status on Legislative effectiveness remains positive and 
significant (p < 0.05), and the coefficient of the interaction between Ideological distance from 
the median and Status remains negative and significant (p < 0.001). In our estimations, we do 
not see any of these four new measures as significantly related to Legislative effectiveness (p > 
0.25). 
Finally, our dependent variable  is a sum of five terms that correspond to the relative 
shares of total legislative activity for each of the five stages of a bill. We observe that the first 
component (i.e., number of bills introduced by a legislator) of LES is correlated with our 
Bonacich centrality status measure (r = 0.47), which might raise a concern. Therefore, we 
constructed an alternative measure of LES by excluding the number of bills introduced by a 
legislator from our calculation. We re-ran our estimations using this modified outcome 
measure. The coefficient of status remains positive (p < 0.062) and the interaction between 
status and ideological distance is still negative and significant (p < 0.001). 
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Conclusion 
Extant literature often considers that organizational influence, the ability to get one’s 
ideas or initiatives adopted by the organization, as a deterministic outcome or even an inherent 
attribute of status. We challenge this view and argue that status converts into greater influence 
only for actors whose ideology falls within what is considered mainstream within the 
organization. The more an actor’s ideology deviates from mainstream ideology, the less her 
status translates into increased organizational influence. We tested this hypothesis using data 
on the work of legislators in the House of Representatives in the U.S. Congress. We followed 
873 individual legislators and traced their status, ideology and influence over eight consecutive 
congresses. Our analyses lend strong support to the argument that status enhances influence 
only for ideologically mainstream actors, but not for actors who are far from the mainstream. 
Our study advances the literature in several ways. First, we illuminate an important 
contingency – ideology – affecting the relationship between status and influence. We discussed 
how previous literature notes that status yields influence via three distinct processes – it 
increases attention, it elicits higher evaluations, and it facilitates coalition building – and 
proposed that these effects are contingent on the ideological position of the focal actor relative 
to what is considered to be mainstream within the organization. We argued that these three 
mechanisms are operative insofar as actors are ideologically mainstream, but their strength 
diminishes when the actor’s ideological position is far from the mainstream. By spelling out 
how the effects of these mechanisms are contingent on actors’ position in the ideology space, 
this study goes beyond a deterministic view of the status-influence link and sheds light on the 
conditions under which status confers influence. Even though status has been put forth as an 
important contingency factor for the implications of other social mechanisms, such as 
homophily (Ertug, Galunic, Gargiulo, & Zou, 2018), our arguments and findings highlight that 
the implications of status itself are also contingent. 
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Second, by illuminating how ideology moderates the positive effect of status, we take 
a step towards providing a more culturally informed perspective of status in organizations. 
Researchers have noted that status is an inherently cultural product, noting that shared cultural 
beliefs underpin the emergence of status hierarchies, as well as the differentiation in influence 
that ensues from such hierarchies (Ridgeway & Correll, 2006). Prior studies have also argued 
that shared cultural beliefs are necessary for status distinctions to diffuse from micro-level 
interactions to the organizational level and even to large-scale societies (Grow, Flache, & 
Wittek, 2017). Despite recognition of the cultural nature of status, research on the effects of 
status has largely assumed culture away, rather than examining the interplay between culture 
and status. Our study focused on one aspect of culture – ideology – that has been shown to 
shape both how actors interpret and evaluate each other’s ideas and actions and how they relate 
to one another (Pratt, 2000, p. 488; Goll & Zeitz, 1991). By illuminating how the effect of 
status on organizational influence is contingent on actors’ position in an ideological space, we 
substantiated the view that status is an inherently cultural asset whose value depends on 
predominant cultural schemas and interpretations within the organization. Goldberg and 
colleagues (2006) found that being culturally mainstream helps organizational members 
leverage the benefits inherent in brokerage positions. Complementing this result, we showed 
that fitting in an organization’s ideological landscape is necessary in order to reap the benefits 
of status as well. By integrating insights from the organizational literatures on ideology and 
status, this finding enriches current understandings of status and adds new insight into the 
interplay of structure and culture within organizations. 
Third, we examined how ideology moderates the influence of high-status actors within 
a political organization, but we believe that our findings would extend to the context of business 
organizations too. The view of status as a cultural asset that we presented posits that the 
mechanisms by which actors confer organizational influence lose potency the further away 
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these actors position themselves from the organization’s ideological mainstream. Whereas 
political ideologies reflect belief and value assumptions about the functioning of societies at 
large, prior studies on the role of ideology in business companies emphasized the importance 
of professional (Freidson, 1994; Weitz & Shenhaav, 2000), managerial (Bowles, 1989; Raz & 
Fadlon, 2006), and corporate ideologies (Goll & Sambharya, 1995; Goll & Zeitz, 1991). 
Despite this difference in focus, at a fundamental level, ideology operates similarly in political 
and business organizations: it provides a set of predominant values and beliefs that shape how 
organizational members make sense of organizational life and informs how they relate to one 
another and evaluate each other’s opinions, ideas, and initiatives. Thus, although the particular 
focus of predominant ideologies is likely to differ between politital and business organizations, 
we suggest that ideologies are likely to moderate the link between status and organizational 
influence similarly. We are hopeful that our findigns will spur new studies to examine this 
hypothesis. 
Finally, although we focused on the role of ideology in moderating the status-influence 
relationship, the explanatory framework we proposed may prove useful in elucidating other 
important organizational phenomena. For example, a long line of literature has examined the 
dynamics of coalition building within organizations. This literature recognized that status 
(Denis et al., 1996; Greve & Mitsuhashi, 2007; Zhang & Greve, 2019) and ideology (Alvesson, 
1992) play a crucial role in shaping both coalition building strategies and outcomes. However, 
the link between status and ideology has remained understudied. The culturally informed view 
of status we have advanced suggests that neither status nor ideology alone may provide a 
satisfactory understanding of coalition building dynamics in organizations, because actors’ 
status and ideological positions jointly affect their ability to forge and join coalitions. Applying 
our theoretical arguments to explain coalition building processes may not only enrich the 
literature on coalition building, but it may also help us extend our understanding of how 
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ideology moderates organizational influence beyond the individual level. Whereas the present 
study examined how an actor’s status and ideological position affect her influence, future 
research may consider the whole network of coalition-buliding ties as they unfold throughout 
the organization. Questions spring to mind when taking this broader perspective. For example, 
how does the joint distribution of status and ideological positions across an organization’s 
members affect the emergence of coalitions? Under what conditions might we expect a 
dominant coalition to develop around the ideological mainstream and under what conditions 
should we expect multiple coalitions to gain footing at the fringes of the ideological landscape? 
How do status and ideology affect the internal cohesion of coalitions and, relatedly, the extent 
of inter-coalition competition? Whereas these questions fall outside the scope of our analysis, 
we believe that employing a perspective that considers the interplay of status and ideology in 
affecting actors’ influence within organizations offers great potential in this area. 
Our study has limitations, which point to opportunities for future research. We build on 
status mechanisms (attention, evaluation, and coalition building) that are linked to influence, 
but we do not observe these mechanisms empirically. Directly measuring these mechanisms 
would deepen our understanding of the scope conditions of our arguments and findings. For 
example, our hypothesis may not extend to organizations where actors’ ideology is not visible 
to other organizational actors, or where the decision-making process is highly centralized, such 
that coalitions and support from colleagues are not critical. On the contrary, our findings are 
likely to be especially relevant in contexts in which actors’ identity is both tightly linked to 
their ideology and observable by others, and where exerting influence requires leveraging the 
support of multiple decision makers across the organization. Prior research suggests that there 
are many organizations in which these latter conditions apply such as, for example, 
professional service firms and healthcare organizations (Denis, Lamothe, & Langley, 2001; 
Empson, 2017; Empson & Langley, 2014; March, 1962; Morris, Greenwood, & Fairclough, 
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2010). Examining our theory in other organizational settings would clarify the generalizability 
and boundary conditions of our arguments and illuminate other facets of the link between 
status, ideology, and influence.  
 
 
Notes 
1. Similar examples are found in the practitioner literature. For instance, MIT professor Jay 
Wright Forrester, who had contributed to model the supply chain of General Electric, often 
found that when his proposals implied radical changes, “clients would thank him politely 
and then ignore his suggestion” (Kleiner, 2018, p. 176) 
2. There are two chambers, the House and the Senate. If a bill passes one chamber, it is sent 
to the other chamber for a second vote. In each chamber, amendments can be passed and 
the bill can only be signed by the President once the two chambers have agreed on the same 
final text. 
3. We reviewed the articles that measure status using Bonacich centrality in Organization 
Studies, Administrative Science Quarterly, Organization Science, Academy of 
Management Journal, Strategic Management Journal, and Management Science. This 
review yielded 53 articles. 23 of these did not report the   they used to calculate Bonacich 
centrality. Among the 30 articles that reported , 26 of them set  to 75 percent of the 
reciprocal of the largest eigenvalue in the calculation of Bonacich centrality. The 
correlations for Bonacich’s centrality scores, calculated using  ranging between 0.6 and 
0.995 times the inverse of the largest eigenvalue, are very high (never lower than 0.96 for 
the nine values we tested in this range). 
4. Ron Paul scored as the most conservative representative in the 110th Congress using the 
DW-NOMINATE method. Despite this positioning, Ron Paul was in the top 25th percentile 
in terms of status (calculated as described in this section) in the House of Representatives. 
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George Miller featured in the 99th percentile of the most liberal representatives. At the 
same time, he contributed to the drafting of the flagship No Child Left Behind act, signed 
by Republican president George W. Bush (Siddiqui, 2015). He was in the top 20th 
percentile in the status hierarchy of the House. 
5. During the entire history of the United States congress, either 1 or 2 dimensions are 
sufficient to correctly predict 85 percent of votes. In recent congresses a 1 dimensional 
model (liberal-conservative) axis correctly classifies voting behavior at a similar level. 
6. A study of DW-NOMINATE scores calculated for separate single congresses with 
adjustments for congress to congress shows that there is great stability in the ideological 
positioning of legislators (Poole, 2007; Poole & Rosenthal, 2007, pp. 78-113). 
7. This example uses congress 106 as an illustration (with only congress 105 providing 
relevant information for keywords). As we construct this measure for bills in congresses 
between 106-112, the relevant data from all previous congresses within this period are used, 
and not just the data from the one previous congress. There are 11 cases (out of 2,620 cases, 
or 0.4% of observations) where bills had keywords with no occurrence in earlier congresses 
in our sample. In this case we assigned a 0 (rather than a 1) for the score of each of these 
keywords. If we instead code this variable for these 11 observations as missing and run our 
models on the reduced sample of 2,609 observations, the support for our hypothesis and 
the baseline main effect of status remains at the same statistical levels that we indicate. 
8. Details of the calculation of these four measures are available from the authors. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
    Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 Legislative effectiveness 1.05 1.60                                 
2 
Number of bills that passed 
House 
0.67 0.67 0.76                               
3 Status 0.70 0.75 0.24 0.20                             
4 
Ideological distance from the 
median 
0.47 0.29 -0.30 -0.36 0.06                           
5 Bill valence 0.19 0.06 0.12 0.20 -0.08 -0.07                         
6 Seniority 6.40 4.03 0.29 0.16 0.29 0.05 -0.01                       
7 Majority party 0.52 0.50 0.37 0.42 0.02 -0.80 -0.02 -0.03                     
8 Majority leader 0.03 0.16 0.06 0.10 0.04 -0.10 -0.02 0.02 0.16                   
9 Minority leader 0.03 0.16 -0.08 -0.07 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.03 -0.17 -0.03                 
10 Speaker 0 0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.24 -0.01               
11 Committee chair 0.06 0.23 0.57 0.40 0.09 -0.19 0.06 0.29 0.23 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01             
12 Subcommittee chair 0.23 0.42 0.20 0.28 0.05 -0.44 0.04 0.11 0.52 0.00 -0.09 -0.03 -0.07           
13 Power committee member 0.30 0.46 -0.05 -0.08 0.05 -0.09 -0.04 0.14 0.09 0.06 0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06         
14 Size of congressional delegation 19.65 15.48 0.02 0.05 0.14 0.11 0.03 0.09 -0.05 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.01       
15 Vote share 69.91 13.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07     
16 Network size 5.27 0.41 0.13 0.13 0.67 0.05 -0.15 0.13 -0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.08 0.03 0.01 -0.05 0.08 -0.01   
17 Network density 0.65 0.08 -0.23 -0.23 -0.53 0.14 0.00 -0.10 -0.16 -0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.11 -0.10 0.00 -0.03 0.09 -0.64 
 
N = 2,620. Correlations stronger than |0.04| are significant at p < 0.05. 
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Table 2. Legislator Fixed-effects OLS models predicting Legislative effectiveness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Bill valence 2.279*** 2.274*** 2.267*** 2.260*** 2.311*** 
 (0.472) (0.472) (0.465) (0.465) (0.467) 
      
Seniority 0.069 0.064 0.062 0.056 0.054 
 (0.062) (0.061) (0.065) (0.064) (0.083) 
      
Majority party 0.659*** 0.426* 0.651*** 0.376* 0.409* 
 (0.079) (0.172) (0.079) (0.164) (0.169) 
      
Majority leader 0.572*** 0.557*** 0.560*** 0.541*** 0.444** 
 (0.160) (0.162) (0.159) (0.160) (0.164) 
      
Minority leader -0.028 -0.019 -0.029 -0.019 -0.030 
 (0.119) (0.118) (0.119) (0.119) (0.117) 
      
Speaker -0.512 -0.509 -0.437 -0.428 -0.288 
 (0.368) (0.355) (0.322) (0.304) (0.231) 
      
Committee chair 3.507*** 3.487*** 3.502*** 3.479*** 3.376*** 
 (0.401) (0.401) (0.400) (0.399) (0.375) 
      
Subcommittee chair 0.266** 0.254* 0.266** 0.253* 0.240* 
 (0.097) (0.099) (0.097) (0.100) (0.099) 
      
Power committee member -0.476*** -0.481*** -0.481*** -0.487*** -0.449*** 
 (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) 
      
Size of congressional delegation 0.035 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.037 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) 
      
Vote share -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
      
Network size 0.084 0.120 -0.034 0.001 -0.050 
 (0.133) (0.132) (0.122) (0.124) (0.129) 
      
Network density -0.956 -0.763 -0.503 -0.248 -0.264 
 (0.665) (0.691) (0.752) (0.767) (0.775) 
      
Ideological distance from the median  -0.496  -0.582 0.010 
  (0.368)  (0.354) (0.409) 
      
Status   0.176+ 0.187* 0.607*** 
   (0.094) (0.092) (0.157) 
      
Status * Ideological distance from the 
median 
    -0.823*** 
(0.209) 
      
Constant -0.585 -0.499 -0.354 -0.239 -0.365 
 (1.434) (1.427) (1.396) (1.383) (1.371) 
N 2,620 2,620 2,620 2,620 2,620 
R2 0.420 0.421 0.422 0.423 0.438 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All tests are two-tailed. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001. 
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Table 3. Legislator fixed effects OLS models predicting Number of bills that passed House. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Bill valence 3.005*** 3.008*** 3.000*** 3.002*** 3.014*** 
 (0.263) (0.264) (0.260) (0.261) (0.260) 
      
Seniority 0.047+ 0.049* 0.044 0.045+ 0.045 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.030) 
      
Majority party 0.375*** 0.475*** 0.371*** 0.455*** 0.462*** 
 (0.036) (0.083) (0.036) (0.083) (0.083) 
      
Majority leader 0.360*** 0.367*** 0.355*** 0.361*** 0.338*** 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.086) 
      
Minority leader 0.081 0.077 0.080 0.077 0.074 
 (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) 
      
Speaker -0.492*** -0.494*** -0.459*** -0.461*** -0.428*** 
 (0.144) (0.149) (0.126) (0.131) (0.116) 
      
Committee chair 0.874*** 0.883*** 0.872*** 0.879*** 0.855*** 
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.074) 
      
Subcommittee chair 0.134** 0.138** 0.134** 0.138** 0.135** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
      
Power committee member -0.201*** -0.199*** -0.203*** -0.201*** -0.192*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
      
Size of congressional delegation 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.021 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
      
Vote share 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      
Network size 0.073 0.058 0.021 0.010 -0.002 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
      
Network density -0.286 -0.369 -0.084 -0.162 -0.166 
 (0.319) (0.318) (0.332) (0.333) (0.332) 
      
Ideological distance from the median  0.213  0.178 0.317* 
  (0.154)  (0.153) (0.160) 
      
Status   0.078** 0.075** 0.174*** 
   (0.028) (0.028) (0.042) 
      
Status * Ideological distance from the 
median 
    -0.193** 
(0.063) 
Constant -1.002 -1.039 -0.899 -0.935 -0.964 
 (0.664) (0.664) (0.662) (0.663) (0.662) 
N 2,620 2,620 2,620 2,620 2,620 
R2 0.381 0.381 0.383 0.384 0.388 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All tests are two-tailed. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001. 
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Figure 1. Plot of the interaction between Status and Ideological distance from the median on 
Legislative effectiveness (using model 5 in Table 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Plot of the interaction between Status and Ideological distance from the median on 
Number of bills that passed House (using model 5 in Table 3) 
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